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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals impermissibly conflict with

existing case law regarding admissions of the parties as supplementing the record on
appeal?
2.

Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case conflict with its

decision in Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 898 P.2d 1230, 265 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995)?
3.

Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case conflict with the

decision of this Court in Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 801
P.2d 909 (Utah 1990) and create a privilege where none exists?

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
By this petition for a Writ of Certiorari, petitioner Van Adams seeks review of the
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, issued and filed on June 20, 1996. On or about
July 1, 1996, petitionerfiledhis motion for reconsideration (petition for rehearing), which
was summarily denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 19, 1996.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Thefinalorder of the Court of Appeals, the order denying petitioner's petition for
rehearing, was entered on July 19, 1996. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
CmvDWS\Pleaduigs\Adams-Pet for Cert.
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consider this petition pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(3), Utah Code Annotated and
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Petition is filed within the time
required by Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
See Appendix 3 for full text of the following rules:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 26.
Rule 60.

General provisions governing discovery.
Relief from judgment or order.

Utah Rules of Evidence:
Rule 504(c). Who may claim the privilege.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
On or about May 24, 1995, petitioner appealed from the final judgment of the

Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael K. Burton, Judge. The underlying matter is a contract dispute between Jus 4 Fun
Rental, Inc. and the defendant, Van Adams.
Jus 4 Fun Rental rented two jet skis to the defendant and alleged that substantial
damage was done to the skis during the time they were in defendant's possession and
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under his control. After the parties were unsuccessful in attempting to resolve the dispute,
Jus 4 Fun Rental assigned its cause of action to Action Collection Service, Inc., the
plaintiff in the proceedings below.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
The complaint in this case was filed on June 15, 1993. After defendant had filed

his answer to the complaint, counsel for the plaintiff signed and filed a document entitled
"Satisfaction of Judgment" with the court on December 2, 1993, which resulted in the
case being dismissed.1
A motion to vacate the dismissal was filed by counsel for the plaintiff on June 22,
1994. Defendant resisted that motion and, alternatively, sought to compel more complete
responses to defendant's discovery requests.
A hearing was held on both the motion to vacate the dismissal and the motion to
compel discovery responses. Without announcing the basis for its decision, the trial court
granted the motion to vacate the dismissal. While sustaining some of defendant's requests
for additional discovery, the trial court denied defendant the right to discover information

1

The Utah Court of Appeals declined to address the defendant's substantive procedural
arguments because no order of dismissal was located in the record on appeal, even though
defendant designated the entire record. It appears that the "order of dismissal" was an
administrative order in response to the Satisfaction of Judgment filed by plaintiff and not an
order signed by the trial court.
Cm\DWSPleadings\Adams-Pet. for Cert
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constituting admissions by Jus 4 Fun Rental vital to its defenses and determined, without
factual basis, that the plaintiff and Jus 4 Fun Rental were the same; therefore, counsel for
the plaintiff was counsel for Jus 4 Fun Rental and defendant was not entitled to discover
any communications between counsel for plaintiff and counsel for Jus 4 Fun Rental.
After a trial on the merits, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against defendant on May 18, 1995. Notice of appeal was timely filed by the defendant
on May 24, 1995.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. With respect
to the defendant's procedural arguments, the Court of Appeals implicitly found that
defendant had failed to meet his burden on appeal of seeing that the record contains the
material necessary to support his appeal because the record on appeal did not contain a
copy of an order of dismissal. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals, which ignored defendant's argument that the admissions of plaintiff
regarding the existence of the order of dismissal were sufficient to supplement the record.
With respect to the other issues raised by defendant on appeal, the Utah Court of
Appeals summarily rejected those arguments as being "without merit".

The court gave

no insight into its analysis of the issues presented. Perhaps the Court of Appeals felt it
should not be burdened with such a small case. Dollar amounts do not alter principles of
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law or justice, however, and the courts have a duty to review fully arguments made. The
Court of Appeals disregarded its duty in favor of convenience concerning the appeal on
the merits, including the absence of findings on an essential element of plaintiffs case that the damage to the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear." A true and correct
copy of the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals is attached as Appendix 1.
Thereafter, the defendant sought reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, which
was denied by Order, dated July 19, 1996. A true and correct copy of the Order is
attached hereto as Appendix 2.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

The plaintiff in this case is the assignee of Jus 4 Fun Rental. Complaint, ^

3, R. 1. The complaint in this action wasfiledon June 15, 1993. R. 1-3. Defendant filed
his answer to the complaint on July 6, 1993. R. 8-13.
2.

On December 2, 1993, plaintiff, through its then counsel, Jeff L. Hollings-

worth,fileda document with the court entitled "Satisfaction of Judgment" (R. 15), which
resulted in the action being dismissed.
3.

On June 22, 1994, plaintiff, through its then counsel, R. Craig Schneider,

filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order. R. 99-105. That motion was based upon an
allegation that the Satisfaction of Judgment was prepared in error by a non-attorney

CmVDWS\Pleadings\Adams-Pet for Cert
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employee and filed with the court by mistake. The motion was brought pursuant to the
provisions of Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(l)(5) [sic]; however, the motion also referred to Utah
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7). R. 101.
4.

On July 11, 1994, defendant, through counsel, filed an objection to the

motion and, alternatively, requested that the court enter an order compelling the plaintiff
to provide supplemental responses to the defendant's previously filed discovery requests.
R. 115-195. That objection and motion was supported by a memorandum of points and
authorities. R. 196 - 209.
5.

A hearing was held on September 7, 1994, at which the court heard

arguments relative to the plaintiffs motion to set aside the dismissal and the defendant's
alternative motion to compel discovery. R. 362 - 379 (transcript of proceedings).
Without designating the basis for its ruling, the court granted the motion to set aside the
dismissal at that hearing. R. 377.
6.

At that same hearing, the court declined to compel the plaintiff to respond

to certain discovery requests propounded by defendant on the basis of relevancy (R. 370 371) and privilege (R. 375 - 376).
7.

A trial on the merits was held on February 2, 1995. R. 380 - 518 (transcript

of proceedings). At the trial, the plaintiff presented evidence and testimony concerning
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the alleged damage to the rented jet skis, for the repair of which the owner, Jus 4 Fun
Rental, claimed a right to compensation from defendant.
8.

At the trial, the defendant presented the testimony of an expert witness, Ron

Sprouse, who testified that the damage shown in the photographs submitted into evidence
by the plaintiff was the result of reasonable wear and tear, as that term is used in the jet
ski rental industry. R. 478 - 501. No evidence was presented by the plaintiff concerning
whether the damage was the result of reasonable wear and tear.
9.

On April 6, 1995, the court entered its written decision (R. 335 - 336),

finding for the plaintiff and against the defendant, and directing counsel for the plaintiff
to prepare the necessary documents to give effect to the court's judgment.
10.

The court executed and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and Order and Judgment on May 18, 1995. R. 337 - 344.
11.

Defendant's notice of appeal was timelyfiledon May 24, 1995. R. 345-346.

12.

On appeal, defendant raised the following issues:
a.

Did the trial court err when it granted plaintiffs motion for relief from

the dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)?
i.

Was the trial court without jurisdiction to set aside the

dismissal because the motion to set aside was untimely under Utah R.Civ.P.
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60(b)(1)?
ii.

Did the trial court err if it is found that it set aside the

dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)?
iii.

Did the trial court err if it is found that it set aside the

dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7)?
b.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs motion

to set aside the dismissal?
c.

Did the trial court err when it refused to allow discovery essential to

defendant's defenses?
d.

Did the trial court err in awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff

without adequate findings?
e.

Are the trial court's findings supported by substantial evidence?

f.

Did the trial court err by failing to find that the "damage" exceeded

"reasonable wear and tear", as allowed under the terms of the rental contract?
13.

The Court of Appeals disposed of the issues identified above in subpara-

graphs a. (including its three subparts) and b. by noting that there was no order in the
record on appeal and determining that the "assumed dismissal appears only to have
remedied a nonexistant [sic] order." See Appendix 1.

Cm\DWS\Pleadings\Adams-Pet. for Cert.
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14.

Regarding the remaining issues identified above in subparagraphs a, d., e.,

and f, the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals stated only that the court had
"reviewed these claims and [found] them to be without merit." Id.
15.

Defendant sought reconsideration on the following grounds:
a.

The absence of the orderfromthe record was not fatal to defendant's

appeal because the plaintiff admitted the existence of the dismissal order. In fact,
it was plaintiff who moved for relief from the order of dismissal.
b.

The decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it relates to the

uncontroverted expert testimony of defendant's witness is contrary to the decision
of the Court of Appeals in Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 898 P.2d 1230, 265
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
16.

By order dated July 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied defendant's

motion for reconsideration. See Appendix 2.

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
The provisions of Utah R. App. P. 46 gives guidance concerning the circumstances
in which this Court will consider granting a petition for certiorari. Included in that
recitation are the following:
a.

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in

CmlDWS\Pleadings\Adams-Pet. for Cert.
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conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue
of law;
b.

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state

or federal law in a way which is in conflict with a decision of this Court; and/or
c.

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that

has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
Defendant respectfully submits that the decision of the Court of Appeals should
be reviewed by this Court because each of the above criteria are met. The decision of the
Court of Appeals conflicts with a prior decision of that court. The decision sanctions the
trial court's departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. The
decision departs from decisions of this Court in that it creates a privilege where none
previously existed and impermissibly restricts the defendant's right to obtain discovery.

Cm\DWS\Pieadmgs\Adams-Pet for Cert
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
RELATIVE TO DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS
ARGUMENT CONTRADICTS ITS PRIOR
RULING IN GLEZOS v. FRONTIER INVESTMENTS
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals stated that it had considered
the arguments of defendant relative to the discovery and expert witness arguments and
determined them to be without merit. Even though specifically presented to the court in
defendant's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals refused to consider its own
precedent, which was decided last year.
On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court erred in disregarding the only
evidence presented on the issue of what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" as that
term applies to the use of rental jet skis. Defendant could only owe money if the alleged
damage to the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear." In its brief, plaintiff argued
that defendant assigned error to the trial court for failing to define the term "reasonable
wear and tear" and asserted that no definition of the term exists in case law. Brief of
Appellee, page 26. That characterization misses the thrust of defendant's argument.
Defendant argued that, in order to determine the measure of damages, the trial
court was obligated to determine what, if any, damage to the jet skis exceeded the
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"reasonable wear and tear" allowed in the contract. To support his position, defendant
introduced expert testimony on that issue. Defendant's expert testified that nothing in
the condition of the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear," as that term is used in
the jet ski rental industry. That testimony was uncontroverted.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the argument had no merit, at least in
regard to the expert witness argument, overlooks that court's recent decision in Glezos
v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995). That case involved the
interpretation of a liquidated damages provision in a contract for purchase of property.
In Glezos, this court held that the trial court improperly ignored uncontroverted expert
testimony regrading the fair market value of the property at forfeiture. In the instant case,
the trial court improperly ignored the uncontroverted expert testimony relative to the
definition of the term "wear and tear" and, consistent with the ruling in Glezos, the trial
court should have been reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant.
POINT II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ADMISSIONS
OF PLAINTIFF AS SUPPLEMENTING THE RECORD
WITH RESPECT TO THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals stated that it did not consider
appellant's procedural arguments on the basis that no order of dismissal was found in the
Cm\DWS^Pleadings\Adams-Pet. for Cert.
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record on appeal and the order of dismissal appeared "only to have remedied a
nonexistant [sic] order." In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon State v.
Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that "appellant has the burden
when raising objections on appeal to see that the record contains the materials necessary
to support his appeal."
The court's conclusion implicitly determined that appellant's procedural argument
was not considered because no order of dismissal was found in the record on appeal, even
though defendant designated the entire record on appeal. The court refused to consider
defendant's procedural arguments because it was unable to locate the order of dismissal
in the record on appeal. The court's refusal to consider defendant's procedural arguments
ignores the fact that the order of dismissal, itself, is not necessary to resolution of the
procedural errors assigned by defendant.
Other courts have determined that an admission by a party in an appellate brief are
sufficient to supplement the record on appeal. The court in Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745
(Okl. 1989), discussed the issue in the context of a lien foreclosure action:
. . . Because the judgment roll in the earlier has not been
included in the appellate record tendered for our review in this
appeal, there is here absolutely 110 record from the prior case
for our consideration. [Footnote omitted.] The parties unequivocally admit in their briefs that the trial court ruled on
May 1, 1978 [footnote omitted] for the Supplier on the latter's
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claim for money, while the Hen phase of the dispute, later
resolved in Reeves' favor, was decided on August 31, 1978.
[Footnote omitted.] Were it notfor these critical admissions
in the parties' briefs> failure to incorporate the judgment
roll from the earlier suit would have been fatal to Reeves'
appeal. [Footnote omitted.] Without the admitted facts, we
would be compelled to affirm because the record would be
insufficient to pass on the dispositive prevailing-party-status
and the bar-of-limitation issues. . . . Inasmuch as the critical
extra-record facts, which stand admitted in the parties' briefs,
may be regarded as supplementing the incomplete appellate
record [footnote omitted] and are ample to supple the deficiency, the errors Reeves urge for reversal can undergo
appellate scrutiny.
Id. at 753-754 (emphasis supplied).See, also, Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 791 P.2d 84, 86
n.3 (Okl. 1990); Womack v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 726 P.2d 1178, 1181 n. 8 (Okl.
1986).
The following statements are contained in the Brief of Appellee filed in this matter
on or about February 29, 1996:
. . . The court, by mistake and unaware that a hearing on the
merits was not had, dismissed the case.
Brief of Appellee, page 6 (Court of Proceedings).
2. On December 2, 1993, Plaintiff filed a document with
the court entitled "Satisfaction of Judgment", R. 15., which
resulted in the action being dismissed.
Brief of Appellee, page 7 (Statement of Facts).
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3. On June 22,1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the
Dismissal. R. 99-105. That motion was based upon the fact
that the Satisfaction of Judgment had been filed in error and
that the court had dismissed the case in error.
Id.
. . . As has been detailed supra [sic], Plaintiff had inadvertently signed and filed a Satisfaction of Judgment which
resulted in the court dismissing the claim.
Brief of Appellee, page 13.
In addition to the foregoing references, the plaintiff admitted the existence of an
order of dismissal in numerous other places throughout its brief. It is clear, then, that
plaintiff acknowledged an order of dismissal was entered which resulted in the case being
dismissed. Plaintiff further acknowledged that it filed a motion to set aside the dismissal.
It is from the order granting the motion to set aside the dismissal that defendant appealed.
It is admitted by all parties that the case was dismissed, yet the court refused to rule on
the procedural arguments because of the absencefromthe record of an order of dismissal.

POINT III.
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO REVERSE BASED ON
DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY ARGUMENTS CONTRADICTS
EXISTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Implicit in the Court of Appeals' Memorandum Decision is the determination that
plaintiffs claim of privilege with respect to discovery materials was justified. Defendant
Cm\DWS\Pleadings\Adams-Pet for Cert
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submitted interrogatories and document requests to plaintiff seeking, among other things,
evidence of an attorney's fees agreement by which plaintiff claimed its attorney's fees
damages, evidence of actual repairs done to the jet skis, evidence of the actual cause of
damage to the jet ski and evidence relating to defendant's theory that Just 4 Fun Rental,
Inc.'s claim against defendant was nothing but the furtherance of a fraud scheme.
The instructions to defendant's interrogatories (R. 119-123) expressly require that,
where attorney-client privilege is claimed, the full and complete foundation for the claim
of privilege be set forth in lieu of another response. Plaintiff failed to provide any such
information, but nevertheless refused to answer on the basis of privilege2.
Without foundational information, plaintiff could not, and did not, sustain its
burden to establish that the information it sought to withhold was in fact governed by the
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources
Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990)("the mere existence of an attorney-client
relationship 'does not ipso facto make all communications between them confidential'
. . . each case must be considered individually to determine whether the communication
can be properly considered confidential"). That the Court of Appeals sanctioned the trial

2

See, e.g., Answer to Interrogatory No. 27 (asking for the identity of documents
transmitted to Just 4 Fun Rental, Inc. by plaintiffs counsel): "Plaintiff objects to
interrogatory no. 27 on the grounds that it calls for information protected by the attorneyclient privilege and protected as attorney-work product."
Cm\DWS\Pleadings\Adams-Pet for Cert
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court on this issue mandates review by the Utah Supreme Court.
Plaintiff received an absolute assignment of Jus 4 Fun Rental's claim against
defendant. That assignment was admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-2. Jus 4 Fun Rental,
Inc., the assignor, did not hire a lawyer to act on its behalf. Therefore, there were no
communications between Just 4 Fun Rental, Inc. and a lawyer representing Jus 4 Fun
Rental, Inc. which could be privileged. Notwithstanding the clear factual situation,
however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, sanctioning a nonexistent
privilege.

Plaintiff hired an attorney to pursue its assigned claim.

Confidential

communications between plaintiff and its attorney are protected by Utah R. Evid. 504(b).
The trial court ruled that the assignor and assignee were one and the same for attorneyclient privilege purposes and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
There is no support for that proposition. Indeed, Utah R. Evid. 504(c) states:
The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or no in existence. The person who was the lawyer
at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
Utah R. Evid. 504(c). There seem to be no Utah cases interpreting that rule. However,
it seems clear that a client may have communications with a lawyer which would be

Cm\DWSVPleadings\Adams-PeL for Cert.

17

protectable, and that the client's successor, then, has the right to assert the privilege as to
the prior communications between the client and the lawyer.
Nothing in Rule 504(c) on its face, however, would suggest that the lawyer of an
assignee of a single asset, after the assignment, may converse with the assignor, who is
not the client of the lawyer, and have a privilege as to that communication under Rule
504. The assignor is neither a client of the lawyer nor a representative of the client of the
lawyer.
While the lawyer's notes of those communications, as notes of a meeting with any
prospective witness would be protected by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), correspondence
between the attorney and his non-client is not protected under that rule.
Further, the language of Utah R. Evid. 504 itself connotes a successorship of an
entire entity, individual or corporate, rather than a successor to a single asset. As has
been recognized in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, v.McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662 (D. Kan.
1988):
. . . [T]he transfer of assets from one entity to another does
not generally transfer the attorney-client privilege.
Id. at 664 (also noting that an attorney-client relationship is personal).
Affirming the trial court's ruling on interrogatory no. 24 is even more egregious,
however. Interrogatory no. 24 requested communications between the plaintiff and Jus
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4 Fun Rental, Inc. The plaintiff had objected "on the grounds that is overly broad, unduly
burdensome and calls for the production of information which is not relevant to the
subject matter of this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." R.60. It could not be more clear that conversations and
communications between plaintiff, the assignee, and Jus 4 Fun Rentals, Inc., the assignor,
might contain valuable admissions. But the trial court did not even rule on the objections
raised. Instead, the trial court held that defendant was not entitled to the information
sought because: "The Court: . . . I think it's a privilege." R.376. No privilege had even
been asserted by plaintiff on that interrogatory, but the court blocked discovery
improperly with sua sponte creation of a privilege. The court's rulings on privilege
prevented the defendant from having access to what is often the most valuable evidence,
admissions, and is both erroneous and prejudicial. Without any explanation, the Court
of Appeals affirmed this ruling, finding defendant's arguments without merit.

CONCLUSION
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals (1) conflicts with its own precedentsetting case, (2) sanctions extreme departure from accepted judicial proceedings; and (3)
lets stand privilege and discovery issues in conflict with the clear language of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court should grant
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certiorari to review the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Vv^day of August, 1996.

DAVID W. SCOFIELD
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant j

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, this )Qt^dav of August, 1996,
to the following:
Andrea M. Hidvegi
Attorney at Law
5055 South State Str<
Murray, Utah 84107
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an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Van Adams,
Defendant and Appellant.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication).

Memorandum Decision by NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge; RUSSELL W.
BENCH and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judges, concur.
CERTIFICATE OF BAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of June, 1996, a true and
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in
the United States mail to the parties listed below:
David W. Scofield, Esq.
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters
Attorneys at Law for Appellant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Andrea M. Hidvegi, Esq.
Attorney for Appellee
5055 South State Street
Murray, UT 84107
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
Honorable Michael K. Burton
Third Circuit Court
5022 South State
Murray, UT 84107

Judicial Secretary
TRIAL COURT:
Third Circuit, Murray Department #930006035 CV

FILED
JUN 2 0 1996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS
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Action Collection Service,
Inc., an Idaho corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 950386-CA
v,
F I L E D
( J u n e 2 0 , 1996)

Van Adams,
Defendant and Appellant

Third Circuit, Murray Department
The Honorable Michael K. Burton
Attorneys:

David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Andrea M. Hidvegi, Murray, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Van Adams challenges the trial court's entry of judgment
against him and in favor of Action Collection Services, Inc.
(Action). We affirm.
Adams's appeal first focuses on a procedural irregularity.
Adams claims the trial court initially erred in granting Action's
Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b) (1) because it was untimely. However, we have scoured the
record and cannot find an order of dismissal. The proceeding
vacating the assumed dismissal appears only to have remedied a
nonexistant order. Accordingly, we need not address Adams's
procedural argument regarding Rule 60(b). Cf. State v. Theison,
709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (stating " [alppellant
has the burden when raising objections on appeal to see that the
record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal").
Turning to the merits of the trial court's ultimate judgment
against him, Adams claims (1) that the trial court's refusal to
allow certain requested discovery prejudiced his defense and (2)
that unresolved material facts left the court's findings both
insufficient and unsupported by substantial evidence. We have
reviewed these claims and find them to be without merit. We thus

decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 88889 (Utah 1989) (stating courts need not address meritless claims
on appeal).
Affirmed.

5%3>3P<^
NOTrman H. Jack^n, Judge

WE CONCUR:

/<^&&*'C (w* &l£fi&&^
Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals
JUL 1 9 1996
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-ooOoo-

Action Collection Services,
Inc. ,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER
Case No. 950386-CA

Van Adams,
Defendant and Appellant

This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition
for rehearing, filed July 1, 1996.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.

i < * day of July, 1996

Dated this I*
FOR THE COURT:

/WfluiU N\. &*% C \
Marilyn M;. Branch
Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July 19, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
David W. Scofield, Esq.
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters
Attorneys at Law for Appellant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Andrea M. Hidvegi, Esq.
Attorney for Appellee
5055 South State Street
Murray, UT 84107
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Third Circuit Court
Attn: Appeals Clerk
5022 South State
Murray, UT 84107

Dated this July 19, 1996.

Robin Hutcheson
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 950386-CA
Third Circuit, Murray Department #930006035 CV
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TITLE VII.
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the
opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that
the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a recommendation by motion or otherwise.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, changed the
subdivision designations from numbers to letters.

The 1994 amendment added the Subdivision
(a) designation, redesignating former Subdivisions (a) to (d) as (a)(1) to (4), and added Subdivision (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97
(Utah 1992).

Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties.
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested
jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition separately; or any two or
more of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the
cases. A cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other
filing.
(b) Parties, All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party
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noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition,
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an
order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court
certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to the
Supreme Court. Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by
the Supreme Court should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to
the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from the contents of the
petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix. If a motion is
appropriate, it shall be made to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case of a
stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion may be
made before the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme
Court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of the record
be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- divisions accordingly; added the last sentence
ment, effective October 1,1992, deleted former in Subdivision (a); and deleted two sentences
Subdivision (a), relating to appearance, docket- from the end of Subdivision (c) requiring copies
ing fee, filing, and service, and former Subdivi- of motions for certification and transmission to
sion (c), providing for the respondent's cross- be sent to the parties and making motions and
petition, and redesignated the remaining sub- orders subject to Rule 23.

Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the
final decision by the Court of Appeals. The docket fee shall be paid at the time
of filing the petition.
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a
writ of certiorari which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this
rule or which is not accompanied by the docket fee.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If a petition for
rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a
writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or
of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.
(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this
rule; or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition.
The clerk shall refuse any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket
fee.
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any
other filing. The clerk of the court shall refuse any filing so joined.
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a crosspetition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule,
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plaintiff never moved for a substitution of parties nor asked for an enlargement of the 90-day
period within which to seek substitution, it
was not error for the trial court to dismiss the
complaint. Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1976).
Transfer of interest
—Conveyance by defendant
In quiet title action court did not lose juris-

Rule 26

diction when defendant conveyed during pendency of action; Subdivision (c) continues litigation with same litigants to determinative
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance
pendente lite, resulting in series of endless
suits. Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d
538 (1953).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§§ 225 et seq., 231 to 233.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 58 et seq.
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attorney to confess judgment against assignee,
guarantor, or other party obligating himself
for performance of primary contract, 5
A.L.R.3d 426.
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or
next Mend to sue for granting or vacation of,
or to make a compromise or settlement in such
suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit
against debt of depositor not due at time of his
death, 7 A.L.R.3d 908.
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or
legal obligation contemporaneously or subsequently incurred shall be canceled by death of
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R3d 1427.
Applicability, as affected by change in parties, of statute permitting commencement of
new action within specified time after failure
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848.

Cause of death, official death certificate as
evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21
A.L.R.3d 418.
Attorney's death prior to final abjudication
or settlement of case as affecting compensation
under contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d
1375.
Validity, in contract for installment sale of
consumer goods, or commercial paper given in
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as
against assignee, defenses good against seller,
39 A.L.R.3d 518.
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent,
priority and preference in appointment of, 65
A.L.R.3d 991.
Defamation action as surviving plaintiffs
death, under statute not specifically covering
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272.
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party,
filed under Rule 25(a)(1) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of
party after death, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 816.
Key Numbers. — Parties ** 59.

PART V.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
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(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(2) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement.
(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(4) Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b)
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
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impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired,
except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
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though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action,
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by
the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after
service of the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered
or amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1)
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to
it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person
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within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in *rhich the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 26, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, § 78-21-3; U.R.C.P. 43(a).
Continuance to permit discovery, U.R.C.P.
56(f).
Depositions upon oral examination, U.R.C.P.
30(c).
Depositions, use in court proceedings,
U.R.C.P. 32.
Depositions, when taken, UJtCP. 30(a).
Discovery procedures, Rule 4-502, Rules of
Judicial Administration.
Exclusion of deposition from evidence,
U.R.C.P. 32(b).

Expert and other opinion testimony, U.R.E
701 to 706.
Fee for filing notice rf deposition concerning
action in another stats, § 21-1-5.
Liability insurance, admissibility of, U.R.E
411.
Motions, evidence on, by depositions,
U.R.C.P. 43(b).
Privileges, §§ 78-24-8, 78-24-9; U.R.E 501 et
seq.
Summary judgment, discovery supporting or
opposing motion for, U.R.C.P. 56(e).
Terminate or limit examination, motion to,
U.R.C.P. 30(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8IS

Applicability of rule.
Appellate review.
—Denial of discovery request.
Privilege against self-mcrimination.
Protective order.
—Trade secrets.
—Waiver.
Purpose of rule.
Scope of discovery.
—In general.
Relevance.
—Insurance agreements.
—Official information privilege.
—Trial preparation.
Adjuster's file.
Discovery from state.
Eminent domain.
Otherwise discoverable records.
Subjective matters.
Testimony of witness.
Cited.
Applicability of rule.
The taking of depositions pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in
an action to remove a public official from office
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter
6. State v. Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12
(1961).
Appellate review.
—Denial of discovery request
When denial of a discovery request is determined on review to have been in error, the burden of demonstrating that the erroneous denial
was not prejudicial is upon the party resisting
discovery. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert granted, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995).
Privilege against self-incrimination.
Privilege against self-mcrimination may be

asserted in civil discovery proceedings to refuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed
in depositions, demands for production of documents, and requests for admissions; however,
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party
must show that the response sought to be compelled might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257
(Utah 1984).
Protective order.
—Trade secrets.
Materials that are the subject of a protective
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automatically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of
the federal Freedom of Information Act because the determination of whether documents
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to
be made solely by applying the express exemption for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information found in the exemption itself. Anderson v. Department of
Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th
Cir. 1990).
—Waiver.
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for protection with respect to documents alleged to be
work product waives whatever right a defendant may have been able to assert. Moreover, a
defendant's failure to demonstrate any diligence whatsoever in asserting the privilege is
itself a waiver. Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164
(Utah 1990).
Purpose of rule.
The purposes of discovery rules are to make
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities,
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery
so that the parties and the court can determine
the facts and resolve the issues as directly,
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LR.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A L.R3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence ofjudge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 AX.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
a p peal, 38 A.L.IUth 1170.
J u r y trial
w a i v e r aa binding on later state
civil ^ ^
4 8 A.L.R.4th 747.
Q ^ r e p o r t e r > 8 d e a t h o r disability prior to
^ 3 , ^ ^ n o t e 8 ^ ^ ^ ^ f o r reversal or
new ^
5? A L R 4 t h 1049
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
^
new ^
Qn
d of
°
,
°
- A T « c ,,
r ,
* £ * ° f damages - modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
„
,
.
J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seam a n in
actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq.,
HO, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
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on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with
the lawyer concerning a legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the
course of representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and
the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative
incidental to the professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers,
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in
any combination.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The
person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to
have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud; or
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the
client to the lawyer; or
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to
an issue concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered
in an action between any of the clients.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 504 is
based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United
States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace
and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2)
and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality set forth in
Rule 1 6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
The Committee revised the proposed rule of
the United States Supreme Court to address
the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S Ct. 677 (1981), as
to when communications involving representatives of a corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting the
privilege to members of the "control group"
and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition

for "representative of the client" that includes
within the privilege disclosures not only of the
client and the client's formal spokesperson, but
also employees who are specifically authorized
to communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word "specifically" is intended
to preclude a general authorization from the
client for the client's employees to communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is
intended to allow the client, as related to a
specific matter, to authorize the client's employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to that specific matter
with confidence that the disclosures will remain within the lawyer-client privilege.
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be
directly paid by the lawyer as long as the rep-
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(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
person who made the confidential communication, by the person's guardian or
conservator, or by the person's personal representative if the person is deceased. The person who was the cleric at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the communicant.
Advisory Committee Note. — The considerations that support evidentiary privileges for
confidential communications generally favor a
privilege for confidential communications
made to a member of the clergy, at least to the
extent that the communication is entrusted to
the cleric in the cleric's religious capacity. See
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2396 at 878. See also
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3).
The Committee chose the form of the proposed Rule 506 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (never adopted) for clarity and for consistency with the Committee's proposed Rule 502.
See, e.g., 51 F.R.D. 315, 371-73. The Committee began with the basic concept of the current
rule stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3),
making changes as discussed below.
(a) Definitions. Subparagraph (1) defines
the term "cleric" to include a Minister, priest,
rabbit or other similar functionary of a religious organization." The non-denominational
and gender neutral term "cleric" replaces the
terms "priest" and "clergyman" traditionally
used in statements of the privilege, but embraces the same concept. Subparagraph (1) expands the scope of the concept, however, by including as a cleric "an individual reasonably
believed so to be by the person consulting that
individual."
Subparagraph (2) defines a confidential communication consistently with proposed Rule
502.
(b) General rule of privilege. The scope of
the proposed privilege falls between a privilege
narrowly restricted to doctrinally required confessions and a privilege broadly applicable to
all confidential communications with a cleric.
The privilege includes confessions, but also applies to all confidential communications to the
cleric that are (1) "in the cleric's religious capacity" and (2) "necessary and proper for the
clerics office according to the usual course of
practice or discipline." The privilege does not
extend to confidential communications with a
cleric when the cleric is acting in any capacity
other than the religious capacity.
The term "in the cleric's religious capacity"

was chosen over "in the cleric's professional
character" to avoid an implication that only
communications with professional members of
the clergy are protected. The privilege applies
to confidential communications with lay clerics
as well.
The language "necessary and proper for the
cleric to discharge the functions of the cleric's
office according to the usual course of practice
or discipline" replaces "in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs" in order to extend the privilege beyond
doctrinally required confessions. For similar
language, see Iowa Code Ann. 1950 Section
622.10. See also, State v. Burkett, 357 N.W.2d
632 (Iowa 1984) for an application of the Iowa
statute.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The person who makes the confidential communication holds the privilege, but the rule provides
that others may claim the privilege for that
person in certain circumstances. A cleric is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege
for the communicant, though the presumption
may be overcome by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. See Rule of Evidence 301
(a).
Under the privilege as phrased, the person
making the confidential communication is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the communication, but also to prevent the disclosure by
the cleric or others who, by presence in furtherance of the religious purpose or by overhearing
without the knowledge of the person making
the communication, may know the content of
the communication. Problems of waiver are
dealt with by Rule 507.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
and further endorsed the concept that in the
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state
that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any
possible clashes with the common law concepts
of "waiver."

Rule 504. Lawyer-client.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation,
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who
is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A 'lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,

